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Abstract 
 
Scholars have recently begun exploring the construction of what Sean 
Farhang has termed the “litigation state” – namely, the distinctly American 
way in which contemporary federal programs are enforced by means of 
litigation. The attention in this literature to date has focused on why Congress 
has encouraged private litigation to enforce various statutory programs. This 
paper examines the emergence of a related and no less important 
development – the federal government’s encouragement of state government 
litigators to help enforce federal regulatory programs, especially state 
attorneys general ("AGs"). Examining several decades’ worth of congressional 
actions, court decisions, and federal administrative initiatives that have 
empowered state AGs, this paper explores how and why Congress and other 
federal institutions have placed increasing reliance on state AGs to enforce 
federal law. This question has become important not only because this federal 
empowerment has been a major driver of the prominent regulatory role state 
AGs have taken on in recent years, but because the political dynamic 
concerning state litigation differs from other aspects of the litigation state. 
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Introduction 
 
Courts and litigation play a crucial role in policymaking in the 
United States, particularly as compared to other democratic political 
systems. While law and legal institutions have long been important in 
American politics, the relationship between litigation and policy 
implementation has grown considerably stronger since the 1960s and 
70s. As Sean Farhang has explained, the number of private lawsuits 
relying upon federal statutory law has risen dramatically in the past 
few decades. This growth is not simply a reflection of large‐scale 
cultural or technological changes in American society, but has resulted 
from congressional choices encouraging the use of such private 
litigation as a method of regulatory enforcement of federal law.1 
 
While the growth of private litigation has been a key part of the 
new American regulatory state, it has not been the only manifestation 
of this larger trend. Another key development in the politics of 
litigation has been the rapid rise of litigation by state governments. 
States have led increasingly coordinated litigation campaigns in areas 
including environmental policy, health care, antitrust enforcement, and 
consumer protection. This litigation has increasingly been used to 
achieve policy and regulatory goals. The most famous example 
probably remains the massive settlement state AGs reached with the 
nation's largest tobacco companies in 1998, which sent billions of 
dollars into state coffers and placed a variety of new regulatory 
requirements on the industry.2 Since that time, entrepreneurial state 
litigators including former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer 
have conducted litigation campaigns targeting a variety of alleged 
corporate misdoings as well as the federal government itself. Recent 
high‐profile litigation campaigns have included the investigation and 
eventual settlement with the nation's largest banks as part of the 
foreclosure crisis as well as state‐led lawsuits against the Affordable 
Care Act.3 
 
Much like the growth of the private litigation state, the 
emergence of this new set of public actors – especially the state AGs 
who control nearly all state litigation – has not simply been a reflection 
of broader changes in American society since the 1960s. It has 
resulted largely because of the efforts of various federal institutions to 
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make state litigators a partner in the pursuit of federal regulatory 
objectives. The federal empowerment of state litigation has taken 
various forms, including congressional and judicial expansions of state 
standing to sue, federal grants to assist state enforcement, and federal 
agency partnerships with states aimed at building state litigation 
capacity. At the heart of this federal empowerment has been the 
reliance on cooperative federalism, which emphasizes the need of 
state and federal authorities working together to solve common 
problems. The cooperative model is a particularly important part of the 
new social regulation of the 1960s and 70s, which targeted quality of 
life issues such as health care and the environment. It has been in 
these area in which state litigation has played the most prominent role 
in contemporary American politics. 
 
Understanding the construction of the litigation state's public 
face has become increasingly important as state AGs have emerged as 
prominent actors in American regulatory politics. It is also important 
because the political dynamic concerning state litigation differs from 
other aspects of the litigation state. For one, Congress and the courts 
have been particularly sympathetic to expanding states’ capacity to 
enforce federal law through litigation even while they act to reduce the 
role of private litigation. This suggests that the emergence of state 
litigation as a national policymaking tool has and perhaps will continue 
to avoid the sorts of attacks levied against the private litigation state. 
Additionally, while the federal government has encouraged state 
litigation as a way to enlist state AGs as partners in carrying out 
federal regulatory schemes, one of the effects has been to establish a 
powerful new set of political actors with their own often conflicting 
agendas. These actors have increasingly served as opportunity points 
for opponents of federal policies to challenge and reshape those 
federal policies in court. Thus, the ironic result of the federal 
government’s increasing AG capacity has been that state AGs have 
used this congressionally‐assisted capacity building to frustrate, 
challenge, and reverse congressional initiatives in recent years. 
Understanding this dynamic helps to shed light on prominent recent 
state‐driven litigation campaigns, including state challenges to federal 
environmental and health care policy. 
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The Growth of State Litigation 
 
States have engaged in litigation since the creation of the 
American republic. Indeed, the history of state attorneys general, who 
are the officials tasked with representing their state's legal interests, 
predates the U.S. Constitution. For much of American history, 
however, state litigation was relatively limited in scope. State AGs 
rarely attracted much attention nationally as they typically focused on 
issues of importance to their particular state. This included their 
responsibility to defend state laws and state agencies against legal 
challenges, as well as enforcing provisions of state civil and criminal 
statutes against alleged violators.4 
 
However, the picture of state litigation has changed more 
recently. Beginning in the 1960s and 70s, state AG offices began to 
take on an increasing amount of enforcement responsibilities, 
particularly issues concerning consumer protection, antitrust 
enforcement, health care, and the environment. AG offices grew from 
only a few attorneys and staff to larger offices containing new civil 
divisions reflecting their new enforcement responsibilities. Throughout 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, state AG budgets outpaced the growth 
of general government spending in every state.5 
 
As state AG offices grew in size, so did the scope of their 
litigation. State litigation became increasingly coordinated across state 
lines. Prior to the 1980s, such multistate litigation was rare. Beginning 
in the 1980s, however, multistate litigation has become a primary tool 
for states to deal with large‐scale enforcement issues across a variety 
of policy areas. 
 
The most important consequence of the emergence of multistate 
litigation is that this tool has served as the primary vehicle for state 
AGs to have influence over regulatory policy on a national scale. 
Several of the multistate litigation campaigns waged by state AGs 
have involved high‐profile concerns also being dealt with by national 
political institutions, including health care, environmental policy, and 
the foreclosure crisis. In some instances, state litigators have formed a 
cooperative relationship with federal enforcers to conduct joint 
investigations of alleged corporate malfeasance. Such investigations 
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have frequently led to major settlements requiring corporate 
defendants to not just pay civil and criminal penalties but to adhere to 
new codes of conduct. In many other instances, however, state AGs 
have employed multistate litigation as a tool to challenge the policy 
priorities of the federal government. 
 
This occurs most explicitly when state litigators bring high‐
profile lawsuits against the federal government directly, challenging 
various policy choices of federal agencies. This multistate activity was 
particularly prevalent throughout the 2000s in the area of 
environmental law, as several mostly Democratic state AGs challenged 
the Bush Administration's approach to global warming and the 
regulation of air pollution from power plants and automobiles. Among 
other successes in court, the state AGs spearheaded the litigation 
resulting in the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark 2007 decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, which forced the Bush Administration's 
Environmental Protection Agency to address carbon dioxide emissions 
under the Clean Air Act.6 Since the start of the Obama Administration, 
several state AGs have employed multistate litigation to challenge 
various federal policy decisions. In addition to challenging new 
environmental regulations promulgated by the Lisa Jackson‐led EPA, 
several state AGs helped lead the charge against the Affordable Care 
Act.7 
 
Multistate litigation has also challenged national regulatory 
policy more subtly as well through large‐scale litigation against private 
corporations. The vast majority of multistate investigations are never 
tested in court, as the states and their corporate targets reach out‐of-
court settlements resolving the states' allegations. These settlements 
frequently contain numerous provisions reflecting the states' 
regulatory aims. In what remains perhaps the most famous example, 
state AGs across the country sued several of the nation's largest 
tobacco firms beginning in the mid‐1990s. This effort culminated in a 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) that sent more than $200 billion 
to the states and created a massive new regulatory regime restricting 
the sales and marketing of tobacco products.8 Among many other 
restrictions, the MSA prohibited tobacco firms from targeting youth 
through the use of cartoons in cigarette advertising, banned the 
advertising of cigarettes in public transit facilities, and prohibited the 
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use of cigarette brand names on merchandise. The MSA also created a 
complicated structure of payments from the tobacco industry to states 
treasuries that amounted to a new uniform national tax on tobacco 
products.9 This MSA was signed only after Congress had declined to 
enact a comprehensive bill attempting to regulate the industry in a 
similar way. 
 
Since the tobacco MSA, state AGs have used litigation as a 
regulatory device in numerous policy areas. Former New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer, along with several other state AGs, frequently 
criticized the alleged failure of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission under the Bush Administration to adequately punish 
financial fraud. These state officials decided to act independently by 
conducting a series of litigation campaigns against national insurance 
and brokerage firms based upon a variety of allegedly illegal industry 
practices – efforts resulting in new codes of conduct applying across 
the national insurance industry.10 Similar efforts to fill "regulatory 
gaps" allegedly left open by the failure of federal policymaking 
institutions have been increasingly common in numerous areas of 
policy as well. The largest growth area in multistate litigation growth 
area in recent years has been lawsuits against manufacturers of 
pharmaceuticals. Through regulatory settlements with leading 
members of the industry, state AGs have managed to institute 
regulatory requirements not required of drug companies under federal 
law.11 
 
The growth of state litigation, particularly litigation with a 
national regulatory focus, reflects in part a pair of interrelated societal 
trends that have been an important part of politics since the 1960s. 
The first is the increased focus on "post‐materialist" or "quality‐of‐life" 
concerns, which include issues such as consumer protection and 
environmentalism as opposed to the materialist economic concerns 
that dominated the New Deal era.12 Congress, as well as state 
legislatures, enacted numerous new laws dealing with these emerging 
quality of life issues. Much of the growth of state AG offices in the 
1960s and 70s reflected increased responsibilities placed on these 
state actors to enforce these new enactments. 
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The second societal trend has been the increased turn to 
adversarial legalism to resolve complex issues of public policy. As 
Robert Kagan has explained, Americans' reliance on litigation in the 
policy process reflects the tension between the public's demand for 
government action to solve problems on the one hand and the reality 
of America's fragmented political system on the other. Because 
political power is separated among different branches of government, 
this makes government action more difficult. This in turn leads policy 
advocates to seek alternative venues for achieving their policy goals, 
including the courts.13 
 
Both of these broad societal trends are important background 
factors that have helped drive the growth of state litigation. 
Nevertheless, these broad factors do not fully explain the emergence 
of state litigation specifically, as distinct from litigation more generally. 
As explained below, the development of state litigation has received a 
crucial assist from various elements of the federal government that 
have encouraged state AGs to take on an expanded role in national 
policymaking. 
 
Federal Empowerment of State Litigation 
 
Litigation and Cooperative Federalism in American Regulation 
 
The federal social legislation enacted in the 1960s and 70s 
reflected concerns also being addressed in other democratic nations. 
The American approach to these issues differed from the approach 
taken in other industrialized democracies, however, reflecting the 
peculiar institutional arrangements existing in the United States. 
 
One characteristic of much of the American social legislation was 
an emphasis on litigation as an enforcement mechanism, which both 
reflected and encouraged the broader trend towards adversarial 
legalism in America. Many of the new statutes empowered private 
attorneys general to bring lawsuits enforcing the terms of the statutes 
in court. Several of the early civil rights statutes incentivized private 
litigants to bring suit against alleged violators of the statutes.14 The 
Clean Air Act of 1970 built upon this approach by including a citizen 
suit provision allowing "any person" to enforce the terms of the 
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statute, an approach Congress adopted in several subsequent 
environmental statutes as well.15 As Sean Farhang has explained, this 
effort reflected broader tensions in the American system of separation 
of powers. Empowering private litigants to bring suit under federal 
statutes increased enforcement of federal law in a way that did not 
rely upon the actions of large federal bureaucracies. In a period when 
the political goals of the federal legislative and executive branches 
were frequently at odds, this approach helped ensure enforcement of 
federal law even when control of the federal bureaucracy (and thus 
federal enforcement) was in the hands of political opponents.16 
 
The structure of much of the social legislation enacted during 
this period also reflected the fragmentation of the American political 
system in another crucial way. While federal legislation increased the 
authority of the federal government in areas including the environment 
and health care, it also carved out an important role for the states in 
policy implementation. Efforts to reduce pollution and to provide 
medical services for the poor were explicitly based upon a theory of 
cooperative federalism in which state and federal governments would 
work together to achieve common objectives.17 
 
The emphasis on cooperative federalism meant that states 
would have to address objectives dictated by the federal government 
but in a way that afforded states flexibility about how to implement 
these objectives. The Clean Air Act, for example, specified a number of 
minimum standards for air pollution reductions, but allowed states to 
experiment with various regulatory approaches to reach these 
pollution reduction targets. Most federal environmental statutes have 
likewise adopted this cooperative model. The Medicaid system, 
enacted in 1965 with the goal of providing health services for the poor, 
is also built around a frame of cooperative federalism. The federal 
government and the states jointly finance Medicaid, but states retain 
the responsibility of administering the program. In areas in which 
Congress has adopted a cooperative federalism approach, states have 
built up regulatory bureaucracies alongside federal agencies. 
 
The adoption of the cooperative federalism model for much of 
the new social regulation was a legislative choice and not an 
inevitability. European nations, facing the same demands for new 
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public policies as Americans, adopted more centralized bureaucratic 
means of addressing emerging quality‐of‐life problems.18 Even within 
the United States, moreover, not every program was based upon the 
model of cooperative federalism. Medicare, for example, was enacted 
simultaneously with Medicaid but was designed to be fully funded and 
administered by the federal government. The cooperative federalism 
framework defining many different regulatory areas enacted during the 
1960s and 70s was the product of legislative choice, and would 
dramatically influence the shape of American regulation in the 
contemporary era. This approach meant that states would play a 
prominent role in many American national regulatory programs, in 
terms of both direct regulation as well as enforcement.  
 
The initial establishment of new statutory approach of 
cooperative federalism in the 1960s and 1970s opened the door to 
increased importance of state litigation in national policy, both by 
making litigation an important aspect of enforcement and by explicitly 
making state governments a partner in the running of various federal 
regulatory regimes. Since that time, particularly from the 1990s 
onward, the federal government has pushed that door further open by 
explicitly empowering state litigators to conduct litigation with a 
national focus. Congress, the courts, and the federal bureaucracy have 
all been facilitators of state litigation, and have continued to do so 
even as they have sought to reduce reliance on private litigation as a 
enforcement mechanism. 
 
Congress as Facilitator of State Litigation 
 
The choice to adopt a cooperative model of regulation led to 
many efforts to help coordinate state and federal regulation among 
agencies tasked with implementing new federal regulations. Moreover, 
this cooperative vision included enforcement as well as regulation. 
Both Congress and federal enforcers within DOJ and other key federal 
agencies saw state litigators as a potential partner to help enforce the 
complex array of new programs that had been enacted in the 1960s 
and 70s. 
 
The first indication of this was contained in the citizen suit 
provisions in environmental law. Citizen suit provisions, beginning with 
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the Clean Air Act in 1970, allowed "any person [to] commence a civil 
action on his own behalf" against private parties alleged to have 
violated the law as well as the federal agency with regulatory authority 
in that area.19 Although this provision did not focus on specifically 
empowering state litigation, these statutes defined "any person" to 
include states in addition to individuals and corporations.20 This was 
different than earlier uses of citizen suit provisions in civil rights 
statutes that did not explicitly include states as parties entitled to 
bring suits under the law. 
 
Beginning later in the 1970s, Congress began focusing more 
specifically on state litigation as a way to help enforce federal law. The 
first major federal provisions specifically empowering state litigators 
were in the area of antitrust enforcement. The Hart‐Scott‐Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 authorized state AGs to sue in 
federal court based on alleged antitrust violations of the Clayton Act.21 
Under the law, state AGs could recover damages on behalf of the 
consumers of their state allegedly caused by a civil violation of federal 
antitrust law.22 Crucially, the change allowed state AGs to recover 
treble damages for violations established under this statute, granting 
the states the same incentive to pursue these actions that private 
parties already enjoyed under the Clayton Act.23 The same Congress 
also aimed to bolster state enforcement efforts by providing direct 
grants to state litigators. The Crime Control Act of 1976 provided 
about $25 million in grants for state antitrust enforcement 
through the new State Antitrust Grant Program, which enabled twenty‐
five states to create antitrust divisions in the AGs' offices for the first 
time.24  
 
Shortly after increasing state litigation capacity to assist with 
antitrust enforcement, Congress provided a significant boost to state 
litigation by empowering states to deal with emerging problems with 
the federal health care regime that had then been in place for about a 
decade. As enacted in 1965, the original Medicaid and Medicare 
programs had few controls in place to combat fraud.25 Increasingly, 
this led to concerns about the existence of widespread abuse in the 
system, such as so‐called "Medicaid mills" that allegedly provided 
improper health care to large numbers of poor patients in order to 
drive up the provider's reimbursements under the program. In 
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response, Congress enacted the Medicare‐Medicaid Anti‐Fraud and 
Abuse Amendments of 1977. This law granted the states considerable 
resources to establish Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCUs) consisting 
of special prosecutors specifically tasked with tackling fraud within the 
government‐funded Medicaid system. After an initial three‐year period 
in which the federal government covered 90% of the costs of the 
MFCUs, Congress decided to make the federal funding of these units 
permanent. 
 
The grants provided by Congress proved crucial in building 
capacity in the office of the AG. According to an assistant attorney 
general in Virginia, the federal seed money contained in the Crime 
Control Act of 1976 represented "the most important shot in the arm 
that state antitrust enforcement has ever received."26 The grants 
provided as part of the Medicare‐Medicaid Anti‐Fraud and Abuse 
Amendments enabled states to create specialized prosecution teams, 
nearly all housed within state AG offices, which conduct wide‐ranging 
investigations of health care providers and pharmaceutical firms. 
Today, the federal government continues to fund the majority 
(typically 75%) of each state’s MFCU. The grant amounts to the states 
under the MFCU program now total over $150 million, enabling these 
units to employ over 1,800 staff members collectively.27 
 
The cooperative model of enforcement embraced by Congress in 
these early efforts to create a new partner in the enforcement of 
federal law expanded as Congress addressed additional quality‐of‐life 
issues. After enacting five provisions empowering state litigation in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress began explicitly expanding the 
jurisdiction of state AGs in new federal statutes, particularly in the 
area of consumer protection. In the 1990s, Congress enacted eleven 
new federal provisions specifically authorizing state AGs to enforce the 
provisions of federal law. This approach to cooperative enforcement of 
federal objectives has continued through the past decade, with an 
additional sixteen provisions expanding the enforcement authority of 
state litigators enacted in the 2000s. Table 1 displays several of the 
most important of these empowerment statutes. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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A subtle but significant aspect of these federal statutes is the 
way in which Congress has relied upon a changing view of whom state 
AGs are supposed to represent. As noted earlier, the office of the state 
AG had long been viewed as representing the interests of the state in 
legal matters. In other words, the client of the state AG was the state 
itself. Modern congressional statutes, beginning with the Hart‐Scott‐
Rodino amendments and continuing through to today, reflect a 
different conception. 
 
The expansion of AG authority in most of the statutes listed in 
Table 1 relied upon expansions of the common law power of parens 
patriae (literally, "parent of the nation"). This power traces its origins 
to medieval England, originally referring to the power and 
responsibility of the king, through his attorney general, to represent 
the interests of those unable to take care of themselves, such as 
minors, "lunatics," or others under legal disability.28 Early American 
courts consistently held that this common law power had flowed to 
state attorneys general.29 By the beginning of the 1900s, courts began 
interpreting parens patriae powers more expansively, and began to 
support the idea that state AGs had the authority to sue to vindicate 
the state’s "sovereign" or "quasi‐sovereign" interests in the name of all 
of its citizens.30 By the post‐New Deal era, the Supreme Court had 
applied parens patriae to antitrust enforcement, granting a state AG 
the ability to use this common law doctrine to sue to enjoin several 
allegedly anticompetitive corporate activities.31 
 
However, later courts limited state AGs' use of parens patriae, 
particularly in lawsuits seeking damages in addition to injunctions.32 
Several courts expressed concern that states were trying to stretch the 
doctrine as to circumvent the limitation that parens patriae be invoked 
only when the states' own interests were directly implicated, as 
opposed to "merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its 
citizens."33 In other words, states could not act solely as 
representatives of a class of injured consumers because the state itself 
had not been injured. As several courts noted, Congress had already 
made it easier for classes of consumers to bring lawsuits through 
incentivizing private litigation, so the expansion of parens patriae was 
even less justified.34 
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This is when Congress began stepping in to expand state parens 
patriae authority beyond what federal courts were willing to do. As 
noted earlier, the Hart‐Scott‐Rodino Amendments explicitly reversed 
judicial limitations of parens patriae by enabling states to use this 
power to seek damages in addition to injunctions in the field of 
antitrust. As one of the House sponsors put it, "since the several 
States already have the right to sue as parens patriae to prevent or 
repair harm to a State's quasi‐sovereign interests," the law should be 
amended to "allow the States to sue as parens patriae on behalf of 
their citizens or for injuries to their own general economies."35 Under 
this approach of expanding parens patriae, therefore, state AGs 
could sue in a representative capacity even when the state they 
represented was not directly injured. Several groups outside Congress, 
including the American Bar Association, raised concerns early on that 
"damages to the general economy" and similar justifications for the 
state exercise of parens patriae was simply too remote to damages to 
the state.36 Congress proceeded despite these concerns, however, and 
later built upon this innovation to grant state AGs the power to seek 
damages and injunctions in a variety of areas of consumer protection. 
 
This expansion in state AGs' parens patriae is important because 
it enables state AGs to take on a wider range of litigation, much of it 
serving as a stand‐in of sorts for mass class action litigation. Private 
class actions, in which a small number of representative plaintiffs bring 
suit on behalf of a large number of injured persons, became 
considerably more common with significant revisions of Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966. One of the purposes of the 
revised Rule 23, which governs the modern American class action, was 
to even the playing field between injured consumers and powerful 
corporations.37 By granting broader authority to state AGs to conduct 
representative litigation on the behalf of consumers in their state, 
Congress essentially empowered AGs to bring an equivalent to class 
action litigation in a number of areas of law. I will return to this point 
later in the paper. 
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Federal Courts as Facilitators of State Litigation 
 
Congress has not been alone in expanding opportunities for 
state litigation. The federal judiciary has also been a source of 
capacity‐building for state AGs. Through statutory interpretation of 
federal law, courts have expanded the ability of states to engage in 
litigation by loosening standing requirements faced by state litigators. 
This has been particularly true after Congress signaled its intentions to 
empower state litigators. 
 
One of the ways courts empowered state litigation was by 
allowing states to sue under citizen suit provisions even when the 
statutes themselves did not mention states. As noted previously, many 
of the citizen suit provisions in federal law, particularly in 
environmental law, included states in the definition of the "any 
persons" entitled to enforce the provisions of the statutes. In several 
other areas, however, especially in federal civil rights statutes, the 
definition of "persons" entitled to sue did not explicitly include states. 
Nevertheless, federal courts have held that Congress "implicitly" 
intended for states to have enforcement powers under these statutes. 
With only a few exceptions, courts have generally allowed states to 
maintain parens patriae actions to enforce federal statutes, including 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 
the Fair Housing Act.38 
 
Also crucial has been the federal courts' general approach to 
state parens patriae powers, which has tracked the shift in thinking 
about the purposes of attorneys general also illustrated by Congress's 
expansion of this common law power. The courts have interpreted this 
doctrine in a way allowing states to bring litigation even when state 
interests were only loosely related to the alleged harms. In Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico (1982), the leading modern Supreme 
Court case describing parens patriae, the Court referenced early 
twentieth century cases allowing states to sue to abate public 
nuisances but noted that a state's "parens patriae interests extend well 
beyond the prevention of such traditional public nuisances." While the 
Court referred to the traditional rule that states invoke parens patriae 
must allege more than simply injury to an identifiable group of 
individual residents, the Court stated that courts considering state 
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standing to sue must consider any "indirect effects of the [alleged] 
injury" to determine whether the state is representing the interests of 
a sufficiently substantial segment of its population as opposed to only 
a small number of individuals. The three justice concurrence in the 
case, written by Justice Brennan, put it more bluntly. "A State is no 
ordinary litigant. As a sovereign entity, a State is entitled to assess its 
needs, and decide which concerns of its citizens warrant its protection 
and intervention."39 
 
This view of parens patriae was an important shift from earlier 
conceptions of what it meant for states to allege a sovereign or "quasi‐
sovereign" interest in litigation. While states still could not simply act 
as stand‐ins for the interests of a few individuals, courts considerably 
lowered the bar that states had to pass in order to successfully allege 
that the state's interests were harmed by the defendant's conduct. 
This point was not lost on some of the justices, who saw this 
expansion as unwarranted. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Maryland v. 
Louisiana, a case holding that states "may act as the representative of 
its citizens in original actions where the injury alleged affects the 
general population of a State in a substantial way," provides such a 
view. "The basic problem with the Court's opinion," Rehnquist wrote, 
"is that it articulates no limiting principles that would prevent this 
Court from being deluged by original actions brought by States simply 
in their role as consumers or on behalf of groups of their citizens as 
consumers."40 Rehnquist understood that this view of parens patriae 
would potentially allow states to allege damage claims having only an 
attenuated connection to actual state interests. 
 
This concern has reappeared in several policy contexts. Several 
states relied upon the parens patriae doctrine in the tobacco litigation 
in the late 1990s, for example, alleging that the tobacco industry 
committed violations of tort law that had a detrimental impact on the 
health and welfare of their states' residents. This, in turn, caused the 
state injury because of increased costs to the states' Medicaid budget 
to cover tobacco‐related injuries.41 This use of parens patriae raised 
concerns because it involved the states using an attenuated claim of 
state harm to essentially aggregate private tort claims.42 The validity 
of this claim remained untested since the states' litigation was settled 
before most of the state suits were resolved in court, though one 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, (August 30-September 2, 2012). Publisher Link. This article is © 
American Political Science Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-
Publications@Marquette. American Political Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from American Political Science Association. 
16 
 
federal court appeared to view this use of parens patriae favorably.43 
Since the tobacco litigation, states have employed broad uses of 
parens patriae, particularly in lawsuits against the pharmaceutical 
industry. State AGs have found much success in these litigation 
efforts, which, much like the tobacco litigation, typically ends in 
settlements with the underlying claims remaining untested in court.44 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that defendant companies have 
chosen to settle rather than fight expansive state assertions of their 
parens patriae powers, particularly since the federal courts have 
continued to assist this expansion. The Supreme Court's 2007 decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA, recognized as one of the Court's most 
important in the area of environmental law, was also crucially 
important for its characterization of state standing. The case involved 
several state AGs' challenge to the Bush Administration EPA's decision 
not to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. The states 
argued that the EPA's decision would contribute to climate change, 
which in turn would "have serious adverse effects on human health 
and the environment." The states claimed that their quasi‐sovereign 
interests were involved because climate change – allegedly made more 
likely by the EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gases – would affect 
environmental conditions within the states, such as rising sea levels 
causing damage to coastal property. Standing was a key aspect of the 
case, particularly because the Court had long demanded that plaintiffs 
demonstrate a "concrete and particularized injury that is either actual 
or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and 
that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury."45 The 
lower court rejected the states' connection between EPA action and 
alleged harms as too speculative, but the Supreme Court sided with 
the states. 
 
Echoing Justice Brennan's earlier characterization of state 
litigation, Justice Stevens' opinion held that "States are not normal 
litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction."46 Instead, 
the majority held, states act under the ancient common law principle 
of parens patriae to protect "the well being of [the] populace."47 
According to the majority, this use of parens patriae was particularly 
justified here because the states have a special interest when the 
federal government fails to protect them. For that reason, they should 
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be treated differently than private litigants. Although the Court went 
on to discuss how Massachusetts met the standing requirements 
applicable to all plaintiffs, it did so with the understanding that the 
state was to be afforded what they called "special solicitude" in this 
analysis.48 
 
The importance of this "special solicitude" standard was noted in 
Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion, which argued that the 
decision "recalls the previous high‐water mark of diluted standing 
requirements."49 He noted that Massachusetts and the other states 
were trying to act as a stand‐in for the alleged interests of states' 
citizens against the federal government, under the guise of the state's 
"quasi‐sovereign interests." The problem with this, Roberts argued, 
was that it conflicted with the long‐standing doctrine that it is "the 
United States, not the State, [which] represents the citizens as parens 
patriae in their relations to the federal government."50 What the new 
rule did, according to Roberts, is treat public and private 
litigants differently when it comes to standing. 
 
It is still unclear just how broadly future courts will construe the 
"special solicitude" rule, though states have continued alleging broad 
conceptions of state harm as a way to gain access to the courts. This 
was the case in the state‐led lawsuits against the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate 
provisions in the law, among other provisions. Much like they have 
done in other policy contexts, the state AGs' pursued what was 
essentially an aggregation of individual claims by tying their claims to 
alleged sovereign interests. In the context of the ACA litigation, the 
states claimed that the individual mandate violated their sovereign 
interests in part because the increased enrollment in Medicaid spurred 
by the individual mandate would cost the states millions of dollars in 
additional Medicaid expenditures.51 This specific claim was not 
addressed by any of the federal courts that ruled upon state standing 
to challenge the individual mandate because those courts relied upon 
other justifications for state standing offered by the states.52 When it 
upheld the ACA in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court did not 
address the issue of state standing at all.53 
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Nevertheless, the broader lesson in recent state litigation, 
including the ACA lawsuits, is that states have latched upon 
congressional and federal court expansions of state standing to 
increasingly rely upon attenuated claims of state harm to bring 
lawsuits representing the aggregation of individual claims. In this 
sense, the client of the state AGs has been subtly transformed. While 
the AGs formally maintain their role of representing the interests of 
their states, they have in practice increasingly been the public face of 
the interests of consumers and other individuals. This development 
has been encouraged by Congress and the federal courts, both of 
which have engaged in a back‐and‐forth exchange ratcheting up state 
enforcement capabilities. When the courts have limited the ability of 
states to being parens patriae actions, Congress expanded the doctrine 
through legislation. The courts then followed Congress's lead 
by expanding parens patriae powers further. When Congress has been 
silent on the ability of states to sue in certain contexts, such as 
enforcement of civil rights statutes, the courts have stepped in to fill 
the gap in a way favorable to the states. 
 
Federal Agencies as Facilitators of State Litigation 
 
Even as states were gaining additional legal capacity to enforce 
various areas of policy, federal regulatory agencies were also tasked 
with carrying out the same federal objectives. While this overlap can 
and has created tensions, federal regulatory agencies have repeatedly 
expressed the importance of state litigation in policy implementation. 
Much like Congress and the courts, federal agencies have engaged in 
several activities that have further empowered state litigation. 
 
First, key federal agencies have frequently supported 
congressional expansions of state authority to enforce federal law. In 
the congressional hearings concerning the Heart‐Scott‐Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act, for example, the Department of Justice, which 
shares federal antitrust enforcement duties with the Federal Trade 
Commission, testified in favor of expanded state antitrust 
enforcement.54 Likewise, the federal agencies with authority to pursue 
alleged Medicaid fraud have supported expansions of state 
enforcement in this area. Federal agencies with jurisdiction over 
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consumer protection matters have also supported concurrent state 
enforcement.55 
 
Federal agencies have also often tried to improve relationships 
with state litigators even when state AGs have expressed their 
intentions to pursue stricter enforcement approaches than federal 
regulators. Indeed, when tensions between state and federal 
enforcement have occurred on matters of national importance, the 
general response has been to increase enforcement capabilities 
through cooperation, rather than attempt to preempt or displace the 
states. Several AGs disagreed with the Reagan Administration's 
approach to consumer protection and antitrust enforcement, for 
example, believing that the Reagan Administration's FTC was much too 
lax in initiating enforcement actions. Throughout the 1980s, state AGs 
brought litigation aimed at filling the alleged regulatory gap.56 
Nevertheless, the FTC expressed a desire for greater cooperation in 
enforcement and helped the implementation of new working groups 
aimed at stimulating dialogue between both sets of enforcers and 
pooling enforcement resources.57 
 
Through these avenues of cooperation, federal agencies serve to 
bolster state litigation capacity. For example, since 1989 federal and 
state authorities have promoted antitrust enforcement collaboration 
through the Executive Working Group for Antitrust. While one of the 
group's main purposes is to avoid duplication of enforcement, federal 
agencies have bolstered state enforcement by providing economists 
and additional attorneys to the states through the group, as well as 
share information and legal documents otherwise costly to the 
states.58 The FTC has also set up databases of consumer complaints 
that they have made available to state AGs through another working 
group concerning consumer protection issues, offering them another 
"free" source of information on which to rely for potential litigation. 
Indeed, this FTC database sometimes results in litigation pursued by 
state AGs independently of federal enforcers.59 Federal agencies have 
also offered various seminars and meetings to train state enforcement 
personnel on issues like antitrust and health care, providing additional 
resources for state AG enforcement.60 
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Federal agencies have also placed an emphasis on cooperative 
enforcement actions that have helped both sets of enforcers to pool 
their resources and have also served to make state AGs a more 
important part of the enforcement of federal regulatory priorities. This 
federal-state partnership occurs across many areas of enforcement, 
with state AGs often working in conjunction with federal regulators to 
prosecute environmental, consumer protection, antitrust, and health 
care cases alike. As a FTC official described their relationship with 
state enforcers in the late 1990s, "the states have become our most 
valuable law enforcement partners….[g]iven our smaller resources, we 
all have to find ways to be more productive."61 More recently, the 
Obama Administration has placed additional emphasis on including 
states as partners in the enforcement of federal law. This has included 
the establishment of new federal-state "strike teams" targeting alleged 
violations by national pharmaceutical companies and financial firms.62 
 
Much of the collaboration between the states and federal 
agencies with concurrent regulatory jurisdiction has been encouraged 
by Congress. In the Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 
1994, for example, Congress inserted a new provision requiring the 
FTC to consult with state AGs to determine how the agency might best 
share enforcement responsibilities with them.63 More recently, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission established as part of the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 authorized the Commission to 
refer information about potential violations of federal law to state 
AGs.64 
 
This congressional support for closer ties between federal and 
state enforcers is hardly surprising, particularly since the so much of 
the federal regulatory structure since the 1960s has been based upon 
a framework of cooperative federalism. The commitment to concurrent 
jurisdiction in the enforcement of federal law has continued as new 
regulatory issues have arised, including in the areas of health care and 
financial fraud. This commitment has also aligned well with the general 
congressional goals in empowering state litigation, to which I now 
turn. 
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Explaining the Empowerment of State Litigation 
 
Initial congressional decisions to empower state litigators 
occurred at a time in which the federal government had already 
enacted a great deal of social legislation and was considering various 
ways of improving enforcement of these new regulatory regimes. It 
also followed congressional encouragement of private lawsuits aimed 
at assisting the enforcement of federal law, which included the 
enactment of citizen suit provisions of the type prevalent in civil rights 
and environmental statutes, as well as procedural changes making 
class action lawsuits easier to bring. The impetus for the 
empowerment of state litigators by various federal political institutions 
in part tracks the building of the private litigation state. The 
development of state litigation power has taken its own path over 
time, however, as some of the reasons for why federal institutions 
have fostered and sustained this particular form of litigation have 
followed a different dynamic. 
 
Legislative‐Executive Conflict 
 
Congress's decision to encourage private litigation as a means of 
enforcing federal law was in part a reflection of broader conflicts 
between the legislative and executive branches. Private litigation was 
a means to carry out enforcement at a time when distrust of the 
bureaucracy was high, both from Democrats concerned about agencies 
under‐regulation and Republicans worried about over‐regulation.65 A 
similar dynamic has been a part of the empowerment of state 
litigation, which Congress has viewed as ensuring that federal law 
would be enforced in the face of alleged federal agency inaction. 
During the debates over the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 
which was the first in a new line of statutes beginning in 1990 to 
empower state litigation, members of Congress repeatedly referred to 
the FDA's alleged failures in food regulation as a reason for the 
empowering an alternative set of enforcers. That state AGs had been 
particularly active in bringing lawsuits against food manufacturers 
during the Reagan and Bush Administrations gave members of 
Congress a stronger reason to believe that state AGs could fill this 
role.66 
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While Congress has viewed state AGs as an ally against 
recalcitrant federal agencies, federal agencies have also viewed state 
AGs as an ally against Congress or future administrations. During the 
1990s, for example, several state AGs and the Clinton Administration 
had become frustrated at the lack of congressional action on gun 
control, particularly after the Columbine school shootings in 1999. That 
same year, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
announced a major lawsuit against gun manufacturers, an action 
joined by several state AGs. This litigation sought settlements with the 
gun industry that would create a new code of conduct in the design 
and distributions of guns, an effort that resulted in a (albeit 
temporary) settlement with the largest manufacturer of handguns in 
the industry.67 Though members of the gun industry were the 
defendants in this joint federal‐state litigation, the true target were the 
members of Congress who had failed to enact a similar code of 
conduct through legislative channels.68 
 
Federal agencies have also viewed state AGs as a way to carry 
over regulatory priorities into a new administration. This occurred near 
the end of the Clinton Administration when the EPA and several state 
AGs teamed together to pursue an innovative interpretation of the 
New Source Review (NSR) provisions of the Clean Air Act. The NSR 
program requires that utilities and other industrial pollution sources 
planning new construction first obtain a permit specifying what 
construction is allowed and what emissions limits must be met.69 Since 
the program's enactment in 1977, both the EPA and industry operated 
under the assumption that the NSR permitting process applied only to 
major modifications and not routine maintenance and repair. In late 
1999, several state AGs including New York's Eliot Spitzer used the 
citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act as the basis for a lawsuit 
against several of the nation's largest electric utilities, a lawsuit the 
Clinton Administration later joined. The lawsuit alleged that the utilities 
had violated NSR by failing to obtain pre‐construction permits, despite 
the fact that the type of construction involved had long been 
considered "routine maintenance."70 
 
At its heart, this litigation involved a dispute over the proper 
statutory interpretation of the Clean Air Act. It also represented an 
opportunity for the Clinton Administration, along with the state AGs 
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who had initiated the action, to maintain a stricter regulatory approach 
to clean air stick even after a Republican administration took office. In 
December 2000, once it had become clear that George W. Bush would 
be the next president, the Clinton Administration and the states 
entered a series of settlement agreements with several large utilities. 
These settlements largely reflected the EPA's new interpretation of the 
NSR process, and required the utilities to install new pollution‐
reduction equipment in order to keep operating.71 Through these 
midnight regulatory settlements, the Clinton Administration's 
interpretation of NSR rules were insulated from reversal by the 
incoming Bush Administration. As Clinton‐era EPA Administrator Carol 
Browner later recalled, she was "constantly looking for ways [to make 
sure] that the things I cared about would continue even if there was a 
Republican administration. Having Eliot Spitzer in the mix was one way 
to do that."72 
 
Creating Alternatives to Class Actions 
 
The partnership between state AGs and sympathetic federal 
policymakers thus in some ways mirrored the dynamics of private 
litigation, particularly the ways in which state litigation could be used 
to achieve enforcement of federal law even when the federal 
bureaucracy was in the hands of political opponents. Given this 
justification, it is perhaps clearer why political liberals would favor the 
empowerment of state litigation. Much of the growth of state litigation 
has occurred in an era of divided government in which either Congress 
or the executive bureaucracy has been controlled by conservatives less 
willing to extend the regulatory reach of government. State litigation 
has been a way to bypass either Congress or the federal bureaucracy 
on the way to stronger protections against alleged corporate 
misconduct. 
 
Indeed, the growth of state enforcement authority appeared to 
be a way to achieve a public version of the class action, which was in 
part justified on evening the playing field between individuals and the 
powerful corporations that allegedly injured them. As Congress and 
the federal courts helped to expand the states' parens patriae 
authority to encourage state AGs to represent the interests of groups 
of individuals rather than the state itself, state AG litigation has 
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increasingly resembled private class action litigation. Congress itself 
recognized this possibility, referring to expansions in state AG capacity 
as "providing the consumer an advocate in the enforcement 
process."73 This view of state AG as a consumer advocate expanded 
along with the use of provisions specifically authorizing expanded state 
use of its parens patriae authority in a variety of consumer protection 
contexts beginning in the 1990s. 
 
Further, state AG enforcement could be employed as a way to 
circumvent some of the problems with private class actions. The 
connection between private class actions and state AG enforcement 
was repeatedly made during the debates over the Hart‐Scott‐Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act. Several members of Congress specifically 
noted that fewer antitrust private class actions had been filed under 
Rule 23 than expected, which made it difficult to ensure that small‐
scale violations of the antitrust laws were being penalized. The 
disappointing results of Rule 23 class actions had occurred in part 
"because of restrictive judicial interpretations of…Rule 23 and practical 
problems in the proof of individual consumers' damages" under the 
antitrust statutes.74 While some suggestion was made during 
congressional testimony to simply allow state AGs to sue under Rule 
23,75 Congress instead opted to expand parens patriae. This meant 
that state AGs were not subject to the requirements of Rule 23 that 
private attorneys had to follow, including notice requirements and 
separate proof of individual damages.76 
 
Conservatives and Empowerment of State Litigation 
 
However, one curious aspect of state litigation has been the 
consistent bipartisan support for the empowerment of state 
enforcement. This is particularly interesting because the empowerment 
of state litigation has occurred contemporaneously with growing 
polarization elsewhere in the politics of litigation. The claim that 
American society is overly litigious has become a common refrain, and 
many policymakers have sought to reduce private litigation through 
polices such as tort reform. The debate about the proper role of 
litigation has become increasingly polarized, with some (particularly 
Republicans) tending to characterize private litigation as driven by "out 
of control plaintiffs' attorneys" while others (particularly Democrats) 
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argue that private litigation is central to achieving justice for injured 
individuals. 
 
Given the increasingly national regulatory role state AGs have 
played through their litigation, one might expect that the public 
litigation state would be folded in to the broader debates in the politics 
of litigation. Nevertheless, though not completely uncontroversial, 
state litigation has generated a far more subdued discussion in 
Congress than that surrounding private litigation. Many of the 
empowerment provisions enacted by Congress were accompanied by 
little or no legislative history at all in contrast to other substantive 
aspects of the bills, suggesting little controversy over these provisions. 
When state enforcement was mentioned, it typically garnered praise 
from both Democratic and Republican members. 
 
This is explained in part because justifications for the 
empowerment of state litigation are compatible with the goals of 
political conservatives as well as political liberals. Much of the social 
legislation of the 1960s and 1970s was a victory for liberals seeking to 
extend the federal regulatory state to address emerging problems. 
Nevertheless, that so many of these new programs were based upon a 
cooperative federalism was a reflection of the continuing vitality of 
American federalism. Conservatives came to embrace the basic 
premises of cooperative federalism as a way to simultaneously avoid 
rejecting the (popular) general goals of the new social legislation while 
preventing further nationalization of regulatory policy. President 
Nixon's "New Federalism" sought to bring states back in to the 
management of government programs, in part as a way to loosen 
Democratic Party dominance of the national bureaucracy. President 
Reagan took this a step further, arguing for a shift of governmental 
functions to the states because "the Federal Government is 
overloaded...having assumed more responsibilities than it can properly 
manage."77 By the 1990s, conservative Republicans in particular had 
seized the mantle of state's rights. House Speaker Newt Gingrich 
articulated an agenda of "devolution" of governmental functions to the 
states, arguing, "We have to decentralize power out of Washington 
D.C., and disperse power."78 Providing greater regulatory and 
enforcement authority to the states was a way to accomplish a 
decentralized enforcement regime. 
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Further, once the cooperative federalism system was in place – 
a system enacted in part because of a bipartisan commitment to 
maintaining a strong role for states in the federal system – it seemed 
logical and politically neutral to try to find ways to make cooperative 
enforcement more efficient. This justification appears often in the 
congressional history surrounding state empowerment provisions. Key 
to increasing state antitrust capacity in the early empowerment 
statutes was "the promotion of cooperation in antitrust enforcement 
between the States and the federal government."79 Congress required 
the federal DOJ to share investigative files with state AGs concerning 
antitrust enforcement under the guise of ensuring that the "Federal 
Government cooperate fully with State antitrust enforcers." Likewise, 
the increase in state investigative authority achieved with the 
Medicare‐Medicaid Anti‐Fraud and Abuse Amendments was aimed at 
encouraging more cooperation between state and federal enforcement 
personnel.80 
 
As with private litigation, state litigation also benefited as a way 
to achieve a stable enforcement regime at relatively little cost to the 
federal government. Members of Congress advocating the 
empowerment provisions enacted in the 1970s noted that these 
provisions "strongly [support] the development of 'in house' State 
antitrust capabilities" that would eventually require no expenditure of 
additional Federal funds.81 Likewise, concerned that states did not 
have adequate incentives to fight fraud in the government health care 
system, members of Congress hoped that providing additional 
investigative authority to states would "enable States to establish 
effective investigative entities and expand existing efforts."82 The 
testimony surrounding the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act noted 
that the FDA itself admitted it did not have the resources available to 
fully enforce federal statutes and that "in an era of dwindling Federal 
resources, the Federal Government should encourage as much 
participation as possible from State enforcement authorities."83 
 
Particularly for conservatives, empowering states as partners in 
the oversight of federal regulatory programs can be a way to claim 
that they are doing what they can to tackle "waste, fraud, and abuse" 
in burgeoning programs run in part by the federal government. The 
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Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ("DRA"), enacted on a near party‐line 
vote by a Republican Congress and signed into law by George W. 
Bush, illustrates the continuing vitality of the "fighting fraud" rationale 
for empowering state litigation. The DRA made several changes to 
major government programs with the purpose of reducing federal 
outlays, including a number of changes to Medicaid. One of these 
changes provided significantly more incentive for states to bring 
lawsuits alleging fraud in the Medicaid system.84 
 
As noted earlier, the largest growth area in contemporary 
multistate litigation has been lawsuits alleging that health care 
providers and pharmaceutical companies engaged in Medicaid fraud. 
Most of this litigation is predicated upon the False Claims Act, which 
prohibits any entity from knowingly presenting fraudulent claims for 
government payment. When an investigation results in a multistate 
settlement, which is by far the most common result, the proceeds of 
the settlement are distributed both to the states and the federal 
government due to the joint federal‐state nature of the Medicaid 
program. The DRA incentivized state involvement in Medicaid fraud 
litigation by providing financial incentives for states to enact and 
strengthen state equivalents to the federal False Claims Act. 
Specifically, states enacting qualified state-level False Claims Acts 
would recover a greater share of Medicaid recoveries in FCA 
settlements, thereby keeping a portion of the settlements that would 
otherwise be due to the federal government. To date, thirty states 
have now enacted state‐level FCAs.85 
 
Republicans praised these provisions as a method of 
"encouraging States to aggressively pursue Medicaid fraud" helping 
U.S. taxpayers "to recover the billions of dollars stolen through fraud 
every year."86 As Senator John McCain put it, greater state 
enforcement would be a way to attack "wasteful and unnecessary" 
government spending.87 The characterization of these provisions as 
"fighting fraud" helped insulate the policy from industry concerns that 
they would result in "unprecedented, overzealous investigations by 
regulators and law enforcement officials."88 The rhetoric also aligned 
well with conservative critics of the federal government who have a 
political incentive to dramatize areas in which taxpayer money is 
allegedly being wasted. 
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Distinctions between Private and State Litigators 
 
A further impetus for bipartisan support for the empowerment of 
state litigation is that the state AGs are themselves political actors with 
partisan affiliations. It is little surprise that one of the foremost 
proponents of increased authority of state AGs are the state AGs 
themselves. The attempt to achieve greater enforcement authority 
enjoys overwhelming support among the state AGs, and bipartisan 
groups of AGs have frequently sent letters to Congress defending 
expansions of state enforcement authority and urging Congress not to 
preempt the states.89 Because the state AGs' push for greater 
empowerment has been overwhelmingly bipartisan, it can help 
convince legislators on both sides of the aisle that state empowerment 
will not benefit one party at the expense of the other. This dynamic 
differs from than debates surrounding private litigation, particularly as 
private litigation is increasingly viewed as empowering plaintiffs' 
lawyers and public interest groups, both of whom have closer ties to 
the Democratic Party. 
 
This is not to say that the role of state AGs has remained wholly 
uncontroversial. Some concern about the potential for ambitious state 
AGs using litigation overzealously appeared in the legislative history 
concerning expanding state antitrust enforcement.90 The role of state 
AGs became more controversial in the late 1990s, particularly after the 
tobacco settlement and a major state antitrust campaign against 
Microsoft.91 Criticism of state AGs as acting with political motives has 
been most prominent when the AGs' litigation target is the federal 
government itself, as with the recent lawsuits against the Affordable 
Care Act orchestrated by several state AGs. A similar dynamic was 
seen from the other side of the political spectrum when several state 
AGs sued the Bush Administration on a variety of different fronts. 
 
Whether or not the empowerment of state litigation has 
generated more controversy in recent years, however, Congress has 
continued enacting state empowerment statutes. The most recent 
have included some of the broadest grants of litigation authority to 
date. While some of the federal statutes in the 1990s were targeted 
towards certain relatively small‐scale problems, such as telemarketing, 
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abortion clinics, and boxing reform, recent legislation has granting 
authority to state AGs to enforce a wider array of consumer product 
safety laws and financial regulations. As noted above, Republican state 
AGs have generally been as supportive of this development as 
Democratic AGs. 
 
What is more, Congress and the federal courts remain 
supportive of state litigation even when these institutions have tried to 
reduce the quantity of private litigation. In 2005, President Bush 
signed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) into law. The purpose of 
this law was to target a number of abuses that allegedly "harmed class 
members with legitimate claims," and "undermined public respect for 
our judicial system."92 The act aimed to curb this "abusive" private 
litigation in a number of ways, including discouraging forum shopping 
on the part of plaintiff attorneys by forcing more class action litigation 
into federal court and curtailing "coupon settlements" in which private 
class counsel are awarded significant fees but consumers receive only 
coupons of limited value. 
 
While the main purpose of CAFA was to reduce private litigation, 
it contained a provision bolstering state litigation capacity. Before 
private class‐action counsel can settle a case, CAFA directed private 
parties to notify "the appropriate state or federal officials to allow them 
to evaluate the fairness to all class members of a proposed class 
action settlement," which includes providing these "appropriate state 
officials" copies of the complaint, all materials filed with the complaint, 
and the settlement documents themselves.93 In this context, the 
"appropriate state officials" almost always refers to the state attorneys 
general. The purpose of this provision was to ensure that state AGs 
could step in and stop "abusive" private settlements benefiting lawyers 
rather than consumers.94 What it also did, however, was grant state 
AGs additional ability to comment on proposed class actions and, 
most importantly, gain "easy access to information that may be used 
to launch an independent investigation into the defendants for 
consumer protection, fraud, Medicaid, criminal, antitrust, or other 
violations."95 The provision could thus be used as a sort of alarm 
system for state AGs. Indeed, this single provision was the main 
reason why many state AGs came around to support 
CAFA in Congress.96 
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The legislative history of this provision also suggests that 
Congress was also careful to preserve the existing capacity of state 
AGs. During the Senate debate on the bill, a number of Senators 
raised concerns that the bill would apply to litigation by state AGs in 
addition to private litigants. While an amendment explicitly exempting 
state AGs from the class action requirements of the bill was defeated, 
it was clear that the bill’s drafters did not intend to reduce state AGs' 
powers. This understanding was apparently bipartisan. For example, 
Senator John Cornyn (R‐TX) noted that "it is very plain that no power 
of the State attorney general is impeded by virtue of [the Act]" and 
Senator Ken Salazar (D‐CO) stated "that we all understand that it is 
going to have no impact on the powers and duties of the attorneys 
general."97 Senator Orrin Hatch (R‐UT) further clarified that the target 
of the bill was private litigation and not state litigation, remarking that 
is was "perfectly clear that the bill applies only to class actions, and 
not parens patriae actions."98 
 
A similar dynamic has occurred with federal courts. Even as the 
courts have moved to limit private litigation, they have taken a 
different approach to public litigation led by state AGs. A pair of 
significant Supreme Court cases both decided in 2011, Wal‐Mart v. 
Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, have effectively made 
maintaining class action lawsuits more difficult through restrictive 
interpretations of Rule 23 and the preemption of state law.99 However, 
the Court has been more solicitous of the states' ability to maintain 
litigation campaigns. One significant example was Massachusetts v. 
EPA, discussed earlier, which effectively lowered standing 
requirements for states. Another was Cuomo v. Clearing House 
Association (2009) in which the Court, in an opinion written by Justice 
Scalia, held that federal law did not preempt the ability of states to 
enforce fair lending laws against national banks.100 This holding, which 
was soon after codified into law by Congress in the Dodd‐Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, opened the door for 
states to take a lead role in investigating banks for their role in the 
financial crisis. Federal courts have also interpreted the Class Action 
Fairness Act as not applying to state litigation, thus allowing state AGs 
a broader choice of venue than granted to private class actions.101 
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Conclusion 
 
One of the chief reasons for state empowerment of state 
litigation was to allow greater enforcement of federal law, consistent 
with the theory of cooperative federalism. The assumption has been 
that state litigation is crucial to the operation of contemporary federal 
regulatory programs, and federal political institutions have responded 
by expanding state capacity to sue. The federal government has 
achieved this objective to a degree, as empowering state governments 
has enabled additional resources to carry out federal objectives. 
 
Nevertheless, this empowerment has had effects beyond 
improving cooperative federal‐state relationships. By inviting state 
litigators to be a part of the federal regulatory scheme, they have 
encouraged state attorneys general to set their sights higher and 
become national political players through litigation campaigns. This 
development has been particularly important since these public actors 
are explicit about their litigation having regulatory goals, which differs 
from much private litigation brought primarily for monetary reward. 
Several of these regulatory goals have clashed with those of the 
federal government. In many cases, state litigation has had the effect 
of expanding public regulation outward by acting as a way to control 
corporate activities. State AGs have also become more aggressive in 
using multistate litigation and their emerging place within the federal 
regulatory regime to bring lawsuits against the federal government 
directly, claiming that the federal government has acted in a way that 
harms the interests of the states' citizens. 
 
The empowerment of state litigation is thus beset with a central 
irony. As federal policymakers from both parties have increasingly 
viewed state litigation as a way of accomplishing cooperative goals, 
state AGs have increasingly used their empowered status to challenge 
the priorities of federal policymakers. Rather than helping to create a 
stable cooperative regime, state litigation has frequently destabilized 
it. At the same time members of Congress were expressing more 
concern about private litigation, it invited state AGs to increasingly 
bring lawsuits resembling private class‐action litigation. 
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The role of state AGs has garnered more controversy recently, 
but the empowerment of state litigation continues apace due in part 
because past empowerment has created various policy feedback 
effects helping to entrench and expand state litigation. The 
congressional invitation to state AGs to be a partner in the 
enforcement of federal law set a new baseline assumption that state 
litigators ought to play an important role in national politics. This 
combined with Congress's provision of additional resources for states 
to build up their litigation capacity, allowing states greater ability to 
conduct litigation independently, especially complex and expensive 
multistate litigation. This new national role for state litigators was 
made more tenable by the presence of a federal regulatory structure 
that, due to choices congressional choices made in the 1960s and 70s, 
was based upon a model of cooperative federalism. When this 
relationship began producing federal‐state conflict rather than 
cooperation, both Congress and federal regulatory agencies responded 
by attempting to promote greater coordination between federal and 
state enforcers – and in doing so, encouraged state litigation further. 
 
Additionally, as states became an independent force in national 
politics, they were better able to advocate for the maintenance and 
expansion of their authority. State AGs have testified frequently in 
Congress advocating for state ability to enforce new federal laws and 
discouraging federal preemption of state regulatory authority. This 
effort has been overwhelmingly bipartisan, which has helped to 
differentiate "neutral" state litigation with what appears to be 
increasingly "politicized" private litigation. Because state AGs do not 
have closer ties to one party than another – unlike plaintiffs' lawyers – 
it has helped shield state litigation from the otherwise increasingly 
polarized debate surrounding the politics of litigation. 
 
The empowerment of state litigation also contains some broader 
lessons about contemporary American politics. For one, it illustrates 
how institutions established with one purpose can pursue results quite 
at odds with the priorities of those who established the institution in 
the first place. Scholars studying institutional change have noted that 
one of the ways in which institutions change is through "conversion," 
or when the institution adopts "new goals, functions, or purposes."102 
In the case of state litigation, federal policymakers initially viewed 
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state AGs as collaborators in the enforcement of social legislation 
crafted around the model of cooperative federalism. Empowerment of 
state AGs thus would serve the purpose of providing additional 
enforcement of federal law at little cost to the federal government and 
without adding to the size of the federal bureaucracy. The functions of 
state AGs partially changed, however, to include forming alliances with 
some members of Congress and agencies in broader disputes within 
the system of separation of powers. The state AGs also have used 
their position to challenge the priorities of the federal government 
itself, giving state litigation a function quite different than originally 
intended. 
 
The emergence of state litigators as nationally important 
political actors is closely tied to the cooperative federalism structure of 
much of the American regulatory state. This helps illustrate that the 
vertical distribution of power in the American separation of powers 
system does not involve a zero‐sum battle between the federal and 
state governments. As Stephen Gardbaum has argued, efforts to 
increase the regulatory power of the federal government during the 
New Deal period was accompanied by an "unshackling of the states" to 
regulate areas of social and economic life that they had previously 
been unable to regulate.103 Likewise, the enactment of significant new 
federal regulatory structures addressing post‐materialist issues since 
the 1960s has been accompanied by an invitation to the states to help 
enforce this new regime, an invitation that the states have happily 
accepted. This expansion of the federal regulatory state has thus also 
granted additional entrepreneurial opportunities for state‐level 
actors to influence the shape of national policy. 
 
Further, particularly as state litigators have more of an impact 
on national policy, it is important to emphasize that examinations of 
American state capacity demands more than the traditional focus on 
centralized federal bureaucracies. Federal policymakers in the United 
States have been quite creative in the ways they have increased the 
reach of the state beyond classic Weberian models of implementing 
government policy. Part of the innovation has been to essentially 
privatize enforcement by incentivizing the role of private actors in 
enforcing federal law. Another part of the story has been the shift of 
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regulatory enforcement to different venues in the separation of powers 
system, including the states and the courts. 
 
The role of state litigation in shaping, constraining, and 
extending the national regulatory state shows no signs of abating. This 
expansion of state litigation has allowed state AGs to become 
significant national political institutions in their own right. 
Understanding this new development in the politics of litigation will 
become more important as state litigation, encouraged on by federal 
policymakers, continues to play an increasingly important role in 
national policy. 
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